Here's what it's worth to beat a credit card lawsuit in Minnesota: $200.

A debt buyer sues you on a $20,000 credit card balance. You think the number's wrong, or the paperwork doesn't hold together, so you do what almost nobody in your shoes does. You hire a lawyer and you fight. Call the lawyer's bill $7,500. That's my round number, not anybody's invoice. You go to trial and you win.

In Minnesota, the court awards you $200. Call it cab fare.

In Washington, under a contract with the same kind of fee clause, the winner is entitled to reasonable attorney fees, whichever side the contract named. Same win. Different state. A difference of up to $7,300.

The fine print runs one way

Here's the clause, from Capital One's consumer credit card agreement as filed in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's credit card agreement database for the second quarter of 2026, in the list of things the bank may do if you default:

"If we file a lawsuit, you agree to pay our court costs, expenses and attorney fees, unless the law does not allow us to collect these amounts."

Now find the other half, the sentence about what happens when they sue and lose. There isn't one. That's the only place the agreement mentions attorney fees.

Princeton's Debt Collection Lab counts 3,949 Minnesota debt suits filed in 2025 under the Capital One name. I wrote about the company that files far more than that in one company, seventeen thousand suits.

It all hangs on the last words: "unless the law does not allow us to collect these amounts." So what does Minnesota law allow?

Minnesota's answer: go right ahead

Plenty. Section 47.59 is Minnesota's statute on credit from financial institutions, a term that includes state and federally chartered banks. Its definition of a "loan" includes "the creation of debt pursuant to a credit card in any manner". Then subdivision 8:

"With respect to a loan or credit sale, the agreement may provide for payment by the borrower of the attorney's fees and court costs incurred in connection with collection or foreclosure."

The Legislature didn't just put up with the clause. It wrote it a permission slip.

I looked for the statute that runs it the other way. The Revisor publishes an official topic index of the 2026 statutes, and its heading for attorney fees lists 294 entries. The word "reciprocal" appears in none of them. Neither does "prevailing". That's a search of the index, not of every word in the statute book. But the index is the state's own map of where fee rules live, and the only entry that hands a consumer the other side's fee right is for tenants.

So when a card agreement shifts fees, it shifts them toward exactly one side, and no Minnesota statute I found evens it up.

And the consumer who wins? Section 549.02, subdivision 1:

"To defendant: Upon discontinuance or dismissal or when judgment is rendered in the defendant's favor on the merits, $200."

The plaintiff gets $200 in costs when it wins a money judgment of $100 or more, too. Then the plaintiff reaches for the fee clause. The consumer who wins gets the $200 and goes home.

There are side doors, and neither one opens for this. A court can sanction a frivolous filing under § 549.211, but a fee award to the other side comes only on a separate motion, served first and filed only if the other side doesn't withdraw or fix the offending paper within 21 days or another period the court sets, and the sanction "must be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition" of the conduct. That punishes bad lawyering. It doesn't pay for winning. And § 8.31, subdivision 3a lets "any person injured by a violation" of the laws subdivision 1 lists, the Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act among them, sue and recover "reasonable attorney's fees". That takes a violation and a claim of your own. Beating a weak collection case, by itself, is neither.

Washington, Oregon and Montana flipped it

None of these states banned the fee clause. They made it cut both ways.

Washington got there in 1977. RCW 4.84.330:

"In any action on a contract or lease entered into after September 21, 1977, where such contract or lease specifically provides that attorneys' fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce the provisions of such contract or lease, shall be awarded to one of the parties, the prevailing party, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or lease or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees in addition to costs and necessary disbursements."

And so nobody drafts around it: "Any provision in any such contract or lease which provides for a waiver of attorneys' fees is void." One catch. Washington defines "prevailing party" as "the party in whose favor final judgment is rendered." A win has to end in a final judgment.

Oregon beat Washington to it. ORS 20.096 goes back to 1971. The party that prevails on a claim under a contract with a one-sided fee clause "shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to costs and disbursements, without regard to whether the prevailing party is the party specified in the contract". A waiver in a contract entered into after September 9, 1971 is void. And Oregon wrote debts right into the definition: "contract" "includes any instrument or document evidencing a debt." A card agreement is a document evidencing a debt.

Montana's, MCA 28-3-704, covers contracts made after July 1, 1971. When one party has an express contract right to fees, "all parties to the contract or obligation are considered to have the same right to recover attorney fees and the prevailing party in any action, whether by virtue of the express contractual right or by virtue of this section, is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees from the losing party or parties."

Set those three next to § 47.59, subdivision 8. Washington's Legislature saw a one-way clause and turned it around. Minnesota's saw one and signed off on it.

Utah, Florida and Hawaii went partway

Utah and Florida leave it to the judge. Utah: "A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney fees." Florida, for contracts entered into on or after October 1, 1988: "the court may also allow reasonable attorney's fees to the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract." That's "may", not "shall". A winning consumer can ask. The court decides.

Hawaii does its own thing. In actions on a written contract that provides for an attorney's fee, "there shall be taxed as attorneys' fees, to be paid by the losing party" a fee the court finds reasonable, capped: it "shall not exceed twenty-five per cent of the judgment." When the defendant wins, the 25 percent is figured "upon the amount sued for if the defendant obtains judgment." On a $20,000 suit, that's up to $5,000.

The same win, seven ways

The suit is $20,000. The consumer's lawyer costs $7,500, my illustrative figure. The consumer wins.

State What the one-way fee clause becomes What the winning consumer gets
Minnesota (§ 47.59, subd. 8; § 549.02, subd. 1) Stays one-way; the statute says the agreement "may provide" for the borrower to pay $200 in costs
Washington (RCW 4.84.330) Runs both ways; prevailing party "shall be entitled"; waiver void Reasonable fees, up to the $7,500
Oregon (ORS 20.096) Runs both ways; prevailing party "shall be entitled"; waiver void Reasonable fees, up to the $7,500
Montana (MCA 28-3-704) Runs both ways; all parties have "the same right" Reasonable fees, up to the $7,500
Utah (§ 78B-5-826) Court "may" award fees to either winner Up to the $7,500, at the court's discretion
Florida (§ 57.105(7)) Court "may" award fees to the other party who wins Up to the $7,500, at the court's discretion
Hawaii (HRS § 607-14) Loser pays a reasonable fee, capped at 25 percent Up to $5,000 (25 percent of the $20,000 sued for)

The Minnesotan who won is out $7,300. Won the case, and out $7,300. In Washington, Oregon or Montana, if the court finds the $7,500 reasonable, the other side pays it.

One asterisk on that table. Capital One's agreement says it's "governed by applicable federal law and by Virginia law." Whether Washington's statute would reach this particular card in a Washington courtroom, or § 47.59 in a Minnesota one, is a choice-of-law question I'm not answering here. The table compares each state's rule for contracts with a fee clause. It isn't a promise about one card.

Why $200 is a bigger deal than it sounds

Fee rules don't just decide who pays at the end. They decide whether a consumer with a real defense can find a lawyer at the start.

The Minnesota State Bar Association's 2023 statewide report on consumer debt litigation found that consumers had a lawyer in 3 percent of district-court debt cases. Plaintiffs had one in 98 percent. And 82 percent of district-court debt cases ended in a default judgment for the plaintiff. The bar association's own worked example takes a $1,000 district-court claim and, by the end of a year, turns it into a $2,042.72 judgment. One of the line items is $479.16 in attorney fees.

When the creditor wins on an agreement with a fee clause, the consumer can end up paying the creditor's lawyer. When the consumer wins, the consumer pays the consumer's lawyer. Heads they win, tails you lose. Do that math from a lawyer's side of the desk. A $7,500 defense that recovers $200 is a hard case to buy and a hard case to take. A $7,500 defense the other side pays for if you win is a case.

Give Minnesota its due

Minnesota knows exactly how to write this rule. It wrote one for tenants in 2010. Section 504B.172: if a residential lease lets the landlord recover attorney fees, "the tenant is entitled to attorney fees if the tenant prevails in the same type of action," and "to the same extent as specified in the lease for the landlord." That's Washington's idea, in Minnesota's statute book. For apartments.

It went further for one class of lender. Under § 56.131, subdivision 5, a chapter 56 regulated lender can't put the clause in, save for mortgage foreclosure: "No term of writing may provide for the payment by the debtor of attorney's fees, except for lawful fees to be paid to an attorney in connection with the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage." That's tougher than Washington. Washington makes the clause fair. Minnesota bans it for those loans.

It even wrote a two-way rule for garnishment exemption fights. Under § 571.72, subdivision 6, when a claim of exemption isn't upheld and the court finds it was asserted in bad faith, the creditor is awarded actual damages, costs, reasonable attorney fees for the extra proceedings and up to $100; when the claim is upheld and the court finds the creditor "disregarded the claim of exemption in bad faith," the debtor is. If a bank breaks § 47.59 itself, subdivision 14(g) says "the court shall award" the borrower's attorneys "their reasonable fees." And a consumer injured by a violation of the laws § 8.31 lists can recover fees under subdivision 3a.

None of that helps the person who just beat a card suit. That's the gap.

So why is it this way?

The record shows what the Legislature wrote and when. It doesn't show why. Section 47.59 came in as Laws 1995, chapter 202. The Revisor's table of amendments by subdivision lists 26 changes since then. Not one of them touched subdivision 8. The Legislature wrote reciprocity for tenants in 2010, in Laws 2010, chapter 315. It banned the clause in chapter 56 regulated-lender loans.

The banks are at the Capitol. The Minnesota Bankers Association reported $1,860,000 in lobbying spending from 2019 through 2025. Those are totals across everything it lobbied on, and the Board's bulk download doesn't say what that was.

What we can do

Write Washington's sentence into Minnesota law. Add a subdivision to § 47.59, or a stand-alone section in chapter 549, that borrows RCW 4.84.330 nearly word for word: where a contract "specifically provides that attorneys' fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce the provisions of such contract or lease, shall be awarded to one of the parties, the prevailing party, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or lease or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees in addition to costs and necessary disbursements."

Void the waiver. Take Washington's next sentence, too: "Any provision in any such contract or lease which provides for a waiver of attorneys' fees is void." Otherwise the next agreement waives it.

Or just borrow from ourselves. Section 504B.172 already says the tenant gets fees "to the same extent as specified in the lease for the landlord." Change "lease" to "credit agreement", "landlord" to "creditor", and "tenant" to "borrower", and put it next to subdivision 8. The Legislature wouldn't even need a new idea. It would need a find-and-replace.

If the bank wins, the fine print sends you its lawyer's bill. If you win, Minnesota law gets you $200. Washington decided in 1977 that a contract ought to cut both ways. Minnesota already wrote that rule for renters. It hasn't written it for you.

First the facts. Then the fix.


Sources

Minnesota: Minn. Stat. §§ 8.31, subds. 1 and 3a; 47.59, subds. 1(k), 1(l), 8 and 14(g), with the Revisor's history table for § 47.59; 56.131, subd. 5; 504B.172; 549.02, subd. 1; 549.04, subd. 1; 549.211, subds. 4 and 5; 571.72, subd. 6 (2026 editions), read at revisor.mn.gov on November 19, 2026 (§ 549.04 on November 21, 2026); Laws 2005, chapter 19, read November 21, 2026. Revisor of Statutes, Minnesota Statutes 2026 topic index, "ATTORNEY FEES" (294 entries), read November 19, 2026.

Other states: Wash. Rev. Code § 4.84.330 (app.leg.wa.gov); Or. Rev. Stat. § 20.096 (2025 ed.) (oregonlegislature.gov); Mont. Code Ann. § 28-3-704 (2025) (legmt.gov); Utah Code § 78B-5-826 (le.utah.gov); Fla. Stat. § 57.105(7) (2026) (leg.state.fl.us); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14 (data.capitol.hawaii.gov). All read November 19, 2026. The table is my application of those texts to the stated fact pattern; the $7,500 fee is illustrative.

Card agreement: Capital One, N.A., "Credit Card Agreement for Consumer Cards in Capital One, N.A.", Consumer Financial Protection Bureau credit card agreement database, second-quarter 2026 collection (terms as of June 30, 2026), p. 6, retrieved November 19, 2026.

Lawsuit data: Minnesota State Bar Association Access to Justice Committee, "Minnesota Consumer Debt Litigation: A Statewide Access to Justice Report" (October 2023), pp. 3, 22 and 28 and Table 4; Debt Collection Lab (Princeton), Lawsuit Tracker, Minnesota data, with counts by year and plaintiff computed from it.

Lobbying: Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board, Principal Expenditures 2009–Present download, report years 2019–2025, retrieved November 6, 2026.

What I could not establish. The Revisor's full-text statute search runs in a browser and was not captured, so the finding that Minnesota has no general reciprocal-fee statute rests on the Revisor's official 2026 attorney-fees index, not a word-by-word search of every statute. California's Civil Code § 1717 is left out of the comparison because its official code site blocked retrieval of the text. Whether Washington's, Oregon's or Montana's rule would reach a card agreement that picks Virginia law is a choice-of-law question this piece does not answer. The history of subdivision 8 comes from the Revisor's amendment table; the Revisor's history note also lists a 2005 act, chapter 19, that the table does not place by subdivision, and that act is an instruction to the Revisor to renumber the motor vehicle retail installment sales statutes and fix cross-references, none of which appears in subdivision 8. I did not read the 1995 session law or the bill record for proposals to change subdivision 8. The Board's bulk lobbying files report totals across all subjects and do not list what any group lobbied on. The $200 figure is the statutory cost award under § 549.02; I did not tally the "reasonable disbursements" a prevailing party is also allowed under § 549.04, subdivision 1. The Debt Collection Lab standardizes plaintiff names, so its "Capital One" count may combine more than one Capital One entity, and its Minnesota counts can differ from the courts' own. Corrections: campaign@madgettformn.com.

Related research

Chosen by shared subject and shared statute, not by date.

Minnesota by the Numbers

Your Lease Is a Contract. Chapter 504B Is the Law. Most of What a Minnesota Renter Actually Has Was Never Printed in the Lease — and Some of It Is Five Weeks Old.

Minnesota's landlord-tenant chapter runs to nearly a hundred sections, and a long list of them cannot be waived by anything a tenant signs. A landlord must send…

Also turns on Minn. Stat. § 8.31
Minnesota by the Numbers

Knowingly Cheat a Bostonian Out of $2,000 and a Court Can Make It $6,000. Do It to a Minnesotan and the Statute Says $2,000.

Massachusetts doubles or triples a consumer's damages when a court finds the seller acted willfully or knowingly, and guarantees at least $25; Washington and…

Minnesota by the Numbers

Minnesota Has One General Service-Contract Statute. It Tells an Uninsured Seller to Print 'Full Faith and Credit of the Provider,' the State Guaranty Fund Excludes Even the Insured Version, and the Phrase 'Home Service Contract' Appears Nowhere in Minnesota Law.

Chapter 59B exempts service-contract sellers from state licensing and from every provision of the insurance code but one. Its definition of a protected buyer is…

Also turns on Minn. Stat. § 8.31
← PreviousTime-barred debt letters110 of 114 in Minnesota by the NumbersNext →Judgment interest

All of Minnesota by the Numbers →  •  The Dashboard →  •  The Receipts: every source →  •  The Platform →

Get the next one

New sourced research on Minnesota law, and the deadlines that matter before November 3. Every claim carries its source.

Subscribe Vote 2026: every deadline →

Discussion

Comments run on GitHub Discussions, so a free GitHub account is needed to post. Keep it civil and sourced; the house rule is the same as the articles: receipts or it gets removed.